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Abstract
Onion services are anonymous network services that are
exposed over the Tor network. In contrast to conventional
Internet services, onion services are private, generally not
indexed by search engines, and use self-certifying domain
names that are long and difficult for humans to read. In
this paper, we study how people perceive, understand, and
use onion services based on data from 17 semi-structured
interviews and an online survey of 517 users. We find that
users have an incomplete mental model of onion services,
use these services for anonymity and have varying trust in
onion services in general. Users also have difficulty dis-
covering and tracking onion sites and authenticating them.
Finally, users want technical improvements to onion ser-
vices and better information on how to use them. Our
findings suggest various improvements for the security
and usability of Tor onion services, including ways to au-
tomatically detect phishing of onion services, more clear
security indicators, and ways to manage onion domain
names that are difficult to remember.
1 Introduction
The Tor Project’s onion services provide a popular way
of running an anonymous network service. In contrast
to anonymity for clients (e.g., obfuscating a client IP ad-
dress using a virtual private network), Tor onion services
provide anonymity for servers, allowing a web server to
obfuscate its network location (specifically, its IP address).
An operator of a web service may need to anonymize the
location of a web service to escape harassment, speak out
against power, or voice dissenting opinions.
Onion services were originally developed in 2004 and
have recently seen growing numbers of both servers and
users. As of June 2018, The Tor Project’s statistics count
more than 100,000 onion services each day, collectively
serving traffic at a rate of nearly 1 Gbps. In addition to
web sites, onion services include metadata-free instant
messaging [4] and file sharing [15]. The Tor Project
currently does not have data on the number of onion
service users, but Facebook reported in 2016 that more
than one million users logged into its onion service in one
month [20].
Onion services differ from conventional web services
in four ways; First, they can only be accessed over the Tor
network. Second, onion domains are hashes over their
public key, which make them difficult to remember. Third,
the network path between client and the onion service is
typically longer, increasing latency and thus reducing the
performance of the service. Finally, onion services are
private by default, meaning that users must discover these
sites organically, rather than with a search engine.
In this paper, we study how users cope with these id-
iosyncrasies, by exploring the following questions:
• What are users’ mental models of onion services?
• How do users use and manage onion services?
• What are the challenges of using onion services?
Because onion services depend on the Tor Browser and
the underlying Tor network to exchange traffic, some of
our study also explored users’ mental models of Tor itself,
but this topic is not the focus of our paper.
To answer these questions, we employed a mixed-
methods approach. First, we conducted exploratory inter-
views with Tor and onion service users to guide the de-
sign of an online survey. We then conducted a large-scale
online survey that included questions on Tor Browser,
onion service usage and operation, onion site phishing,
and users’ general expectations of privacy. Next, we con-
ducted follow-up interviews to further explore the topics
and themes that we discovered in the exploratory inter-
views and survey. We complemented this qualitative data
with an analysis of “leaked” DNS lookups to onion do-
mains, as seen from a DNS root server; this data gave
us insights into actual usage patterns and allowed us to
corroborate some of the findings from the interviews and
surveys.
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We find that many Tor users misunderstand technical
aspects of onion services, such as the nature of the do-
main format, rendering these users more vulnerable to
phishing attacks. Second, we find that users have many is-
sues using and managing onion services, including having
trouble discovering and tracking new onion domains. Our
data also suggests that users may visit onion domains that
are slight variations of popular onion domains, suggesting
that typos or phishing attacks may occur on onion do-
mains. Third, users want improvements to onion services
such as improved performance and easier ways to keep
track of and verify onion domains as authentic. Many
of the shortcomings that we discover could be addressed
with straightforward and immediate improvements to the
Tor Browser, including improved security indicators and
mechanisms to automatically detect domains that may be
typos or phishing attacks.
Tor is currently testing the next generation of onion
services, which will address various security issues and
upgrade to faster, future-proof cryptography. The findings
from our work can inform the design of privacy and secu-
rity enhancements to onion services and Tor Browser at a
critical time as these improvements are being deployed.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We provide new, large-scale empirical evidence from
Tor users that sheds light on how these users perceive,
use, and manage onion services. Our work confirms
and extends previous findings on Tor Browser users’
mental models [9].
• We provide empirical evidence that characterizes
onion domain name lookups based on a dataset from
the .onion requests from DNS B root, both extend-
ing previous work on onion domain usage [18, 33]
and corroborating our findings about usability and
security problems that we identified in the survey
and interview data.
• Based on our findings, we identify usability obsta-
cles to the adoption of onion services and suggest
possible design enhancements, including publishing
mechanism for onion services and a Tor Browser ex-
tension that allows its users to securely and privately
bookmark onion domains.
All code, data, and auxiliary resources are available at
https://nymity.ch/onion-services/.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides background on onion services, and Section 3
presents related work. Section 4 presents the methods
for our interviews, online survey, and DNS data analy-
sis. Section 5 presents results, Section 6 discusses the
implications of these findings, and Section 7 concludes.
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Figure 1: A path to an onion service typically has six Tor
relays. Both the client and the onion service create a Tor circuit
(comprising two and three relays, respectively) to a rendezvous.
2 Background: What Are Onion Services?
Originally called “hidden services”, onion services were
renamed in 2015 to reflect the fact that they provide more
than just the “hiding” of a service [11]—more importantly,
they provide end-to-end security and self-certifying do-
main names. Beyond The Tor Project’s nomenclature, the
“web” of onion services is occasionally referred to as the
“Dark Web”. In this paper, we use only the term onion
services.
Onion services are TCP-based network services that are
accessible only over the Tor network and provide mutual
anonymity: the Tor client is anonymous to the server,
and the server is anonymous to the client. Clients access
onion services via onion domains that are meaningful
only inside the Tor network. A path between a client and
onion service has six Tor relays by default, as shown in
Figure 1; the client builds a circuit to a “rendezvous” Tor
relay, and the onion service builds a circuit to that same
relay. Neither party learns the other’s IP address.
To create an onion domain, a Tor daemon generates an
RSA key pair, computes the SHA-1 hash over the RSA
public key, truncates it to 80 bits, and encodes the result
in a 16-character base32 string (e.g., expyuzz4wqqyqhjn).
Because an onion domain is derived directly from its
public key, onion domains are self-certifying: if a client
knows a domain, it automatically knows the correspond-
ing public key. Unfortunately, this property makes the
onion domain difficult to read, write, or remember.
As of February 2018, The Tor Project is deploying the
next generation of onion services, whose domains have
56 characters [16, § 6] that include a base32 encoding
of the onion service’s public key, a checksum, and a ver-
sion number. New onion services will also use elliptic
curve cryptography, allowing the entire public key to be
embedded in the domain, as opposed to only the hash of
the public key. These changes will naturally improve the
security of onion services but have important implications
for usability, particularly as unreadable onion domain
names get longer.
One way to make onion domains more readable
is to repeatedly generate RSA keys until the result-
(a) Conventional domain.
(b) Onion service.
Figure 2: Tor Browser 7.0.10’s user interface on Windows
10 when accessing the Tor Project website via a conventional
domain and the corresponding onion service. The onion service
lacks a padlock; Tor developers are addressing this issue [1].
ing domain contains some desired string (e.g., “face-
book”). These so-called vanity onion domains in-
clude Facebook (facebookcorewwwi.onion), ProPublica
(propub3r6espa33w.onion), and the New York Times
(nytimes3xbfgragh.onion). Vanity onion domains still
typically have strings of characters that are not meaning-
ful words, but they may be easier to memorize. These
domains are relatively expensive to create: given base32’s
alphabet size of 32 characters, a vanity prefix of length
n takes an average of 0.5 ·32n key creations, Given a set
of domains that contain a vanity prefix, one can search
this set for a domain that is the easiest to remember, for
example by using a Markov model to filter domains that
resemble English words. The popular scallion tool [30]
parallelizes the search for vanity domains.
Even if the onion domain is more readable, the user still
needs to have a way of discovering the onion service in the
first place. In contrast to conventional network services,
onion services are designed to be difficult to discover. The
operator of an onion service must manually advertise the
domain, for example by manually adding it to onion site
search engines such as Ahmia [22]. The lack of a go-to
service such as a “Google for onion services” prompted
the community to devise various ways to disseminate
onion services through a variety of search engines and
curated lists.
Tor Browser aims to make user access to onion domains
seamless. Figure 2a shows the interface when accessing
The Tor Project’s web site; Figure 2b shows a connection
to the corresponding onion site. Additionally, because the
unreadability of onion domains can make clients more
susceptible to phishing attacks, website operators who
want to provide their website as an onion service and do
not care about their own anonymity can get an extended
validation (EV) digital certificate for their .onion domain
so that clients can be assured that they are connecting to
the correct site. For example, Facebook’s onion service
has a certificate associated with it, and this added layer of
security is reflected in the Tor Browser.
3 Related Work
Usage and mental models of Tor Browser. Forte et al.
studied the privacy practices of contributors to open col-
laboration projects such as the Tor Project and Wikipedia
to learn about how privacy concerns affect their contri-
bution practices [9]. The study, based on 23 interviews,
found that contributors worry about an array of threats,
including surveillance, violence, harassment, and loss
of opportunity. This study was not focused on hidden
services at all. Additionally, Gallagher et al. conducted
semi-structured interviews to understand both why people
use Tor Browser and how they understand the technol-
ogy [10]. The study found that experts tend to have a
network-centric view of the Tor network and use it fre-
quently, whereas non-experts have a goal-oriented view
and see Tor Browser as a black-box service. Our work cor-
roborates these findings but is focused on onion services,
rather than generally on Tor Browser.
Usability of Tor Browser installation. Tor Browser has
seen many usability improvements since its creation in
2003 [31], from a Tor “button” to Tor Browser Bundle
(now called the Tor Browser). Ten years ago, Clark et
al. used cognitive walkthroughs to study how users in-
stall, configure, and run Tor Browser [5]. The work re-
vealed hurdles such as jargon-laden documentation, con-
fusing menus, and insufficient visual feedback. Norcie et
al. identified “stop-points” in the installation and use of
the Tor Browser Bundle [21]; these stop-points require
user action but instead cause confusion. the study rec-
ommended various changes to the installation process
and evaluated them in a follow-up study. Lee et al. [14]
studied the usability of Tor Launcher, the graphical con-
figuration tool that allows users to configure Tor Browser,
and found that 79% of users’ connection attempts in a
simulated censored environment failed, but that various
design improvements could reduce these difficulties.
Usability of onion domain names. Previous work aimed
to improve the usability of onion domain names. Sai and
Fink proposed a mnemonic system that maps 80-bit onion
domains to sentences [26]. Their work is inspired by
mnemonicode, which maps binary data to words [36].
Victors et al. designed the Onion Name System [35],
which allows users to reference an onion service by a
readable, globally unique identifier. Kadianakis et al.
designed an API that allows Tor clients to configure name
systems (e.g., GNS [28] or OnioNS [35]) on a per-domain
basis [12].
Onion domain usage patterns. If a conventional DNS
resolver attempts to resolve an .onion domain (as might
happen when a user enters such a domain name into a nor-
mal browser), the resulting DNS lookup for the domain
will “leak”to the DNS root servers. Previous studies have
taken advantage of this leaked information to characterize
the popularity of various onion domains [18, 33]. We
build on previous work, applying similar analysis with a
focus on whether the lookups suggest usability problems
with onion services or the presence of phishing attacks.
4 Method
We used a mixed-methods approach involving interview
and survey data, as well as analysis of DNS query data.
This section details our interviews (Section 4.1), large-
scale online survey (Section 4.2), and the DNS dataset
that we use for our analysis (Section 4.3).1
4.1 Interviews
To help us understand users’ mental models of onion ser-
vices, onion service usage, and the challenges and benefits
of onion services, we conducted qualitative interviews,
which allowed us to design the survey.
4.1.1 Procedure
Interview Guide. We developed a question set that
served as the basis for each interview,2 basing our de-
sign on prior work [9] but focusing particularly on onion
services. The semi-structured nature of our interviews
allowed us to deviate from this question set by asking
follow-up questions as appropriate.
We followed standard consent procedures for all par-
ticipants. We began by asking demographic information
(gender, age range, occupation, country of residence, and
level of education), followed by questions about users’
general online behavior. We concluded with questions
about Tor Browser and onion services (e.g., when users
started to use these services, how they track onion links
as well as the drawbacks and strengths of these services
based on their own experiences). To gather data about
users’ mental models of Tor browser and onion services,
we designed a brief sketching exercise similar to those
used in other work [25]. We asked participants to draw
sketches of how they believed Tor and onion services
worked and followed up on these drawings in interviews.
Recruitment. To select eligible interview subjects, we
created a short pre-interview survey3 asking users if they
were over 18 years of age, if they had used Tor Browser
and onion services, and how they would rate their general
privacy and security knowledge. To the extent possible,
1Princeton University’s institutional review board (IRB) approved
this study (Protocol #8251).
2The question set is available at https://nymity.ch/
onion-services/pdf/interview-checklist.pdf.
3The pre-interview survey is available at https://nymity.ch/
onion-services/pdf/pre-interview-survey.pdf.
we targeted lay-people and aimed to maximize cultural,
gender, geographic location, education, and age diversity.
The Tor Project advertised this survey both in a blog
post [37] and via Twitter. We also advertised the study
on Princeton’s Center for Information Technology (CITP)
blog and recruited participants in person at an Internet
freedom event.
Recruiting a representative sample of Tor users is dif-
ficult, and our recruiting techniques likely resulted in
a biased population for several reasons. First, we be-
lieve that The Tor Project’s blog and Twitter account
are followed by disproportionately more technical users,
whereas non-technical users may not generally follow
news and updates related to Tor via the project’s blog and
Twitter feed. Second, Tor users value their privacy more
than the average Internet user, so the users we recruited
may not be as honest and candid about their browsing
habits as we would like.
Interviews. We conducted 13 interviews in person and
four interviews remotely—over Skype, Signal, WhatsApp,
and Jitsi—depending on the medium that our participants
preferred. Two participants declined to have their inter-
views recorded; we recorded the rest of the interviews
with the permission of the participant. All participants an-
swered the interview questions and completed the sketch-
ing exercise. Each interview ended with a debriefing
phase to ask if our participants had any remaining ques-
tions. We compensated participants with a $20 gift card.
We conducted our first interview on July 13, 2017 and the
last on October 20, 2017. The median interview time was
34 minutes, with interviews ranging from 20–50 minutes.
Transcription and Analysis. We transcribed our inter-
view recordings and employed qualitative data coding to
analyze the transcripts [29]. In the two cases where we
did not have interview recordings, we relied on our field
notes. We developed a codebook based on our research
questions and used a combination of deductive coding to
identify themes of interest we agreed upon and inductive
coding to discover emergent phenomena and to expand
the initial codebook. We had ten parent codes in total,
with examples such as “Mental model of onion services”,
“Search habits”, and “Reasons for using onion services”;
and 168 child codes, including “Definition- anonymous”,
“Word of mouth”, and “Curiosity”. After we reached con-
sensus on the phenomena of interest, at least two members
of our team (sometimes up to four) read and coded each
transcript. We also held regular research meetings with
the entire team of authors to discuss the coded transcripts
and reach consensus on the final themes.
4.1.2 Participants
We interviewed 17 subjects, as summarized in Table 1.
We only present aggregate demographic information to
protect the identity of our interview participants. We
believe that our sample is biased towards educated and
technical users—almost 60% of our participants have a
postgraduate degree—but our sample also shows the di-
versity among Tor’s user base: our participants comprised
human rights activists, legal professionals, writers, artists,
and journalists, among others. In remainder of the paper,
we use the denotation ‘P’ to refer to interview participants.
4.2 Online Survey
Shortly after we conducted our first batch of interviews,
we designed, refined, and launched an online survey to
complement our interview data.4
4.2.1 Procedure
Survey Design. We created our survey in Qualtrics be-
cause an unmodified Tor Browser could display it cor-
rectly. Unfortunately, Qualtrics requires JavaScript, and
Tor Browser deactivates if it is set to its highest security
setting. Several users complained about our reliance on
JavaScript in the recruitment blog post comments [37].
All respondents consented to the survey and confirmed
that they were at least 18 years old. Our survey was
only available in English, but we targeted an international
audience because Sawaya et al. showed that cultural
differences yield different security behavior [27], and pay-
ing attention to these differences is central to The Tor
Project’s global mission.
Most of our survey focused on onion services, but we
also included usage questions about Tor in general be-
cause Tor Browser is used to access onion services. Our
survey had of 49 questions, most of which were closed-
ended questions. The first set of questions asked for basic
demographic information such as age, gender, privacy
and security knowledge rating, and education level. Next,
the survey asked about Tor usage, such as how frequently
the Tor Browser was used. We also asked about onion
services usage in detail, including questions concerning
the usability of onion links, how users track and manage
onion domain links, whether (and why) users had ever
set up or operated an onion site, and whether users were
aware of onion site phishing and impersonation. The last
set of questions focused on users’ general expectations
of privacy and security when using onion services. We
incorporated four attention checks to measure a respon-
dent’s degree of attention [3]. To ensure that participants
felt comfortable answering questions, we did not make
questions mandatory. The survey took about 15 minutes
to complete.
Survey Testing. We used cognitive pretesting (some-
4The full survey is available at https://nymity.ch/
onion-services/pdf/survey-questions.pdf.
times also called cognitive interviewing) to improve the
wording of our survey questions [6]. Pretesting reveals
if respondents understand questions consistently and the
way we intended them to be interpreted. Five pre-testers
helped us iteratively improve the survey; after pre-testing
and revisions, we launched the survey.
Recruitment. As with our interviews, we advertised our
survey in a blog post on The Tor Project’s blog [37],
on its corresponding Twitter account, the CITP blog at
Princeton, and on three Reddit subforums.5 Unlike our
interview participants, our survey respondents were self-
selected. As with interview recruitment, we expect this
recruitment strategy biased our sample towards engaged
users because casual Tor users are unlikely to follow The
Tor Project’s social media accounts.
We did not offer incentives for participation because we
wanted respondents to be able to participate anonymously
without providing email addresses. Despite the lack of
incentives, we collected enough responses. Our survey
ran from August 16–September 11, 2017 (27 days).
Filtering and Analysis. Some of the survey responses
were low-quality; people may have rushed their answers,
aborted our survey prematurely, or given deliberately
wrong answers. To mitigate these effects, we excluded
participants who either did not finish the survey or who
failed more than two out of four attention checks. We con-
ducted a descriptive analysis on the survey data. We also
computed correlation coefficients between every question
pair in the survey, which did not yield significant results.
We thus focus on results from the descriptive analysis.
Each percentage is reported out of the total sample; we
denote cases when survey participants chose not to re-
spond as ‘No Response’. Two researchers performed a
deductive coding pass on the open-ended survey questions
based on our interview codebook and held meetings to
reach consensus on the final themes discussed. In rest of
the paper, we denote survey participants with ‘S’.
4.2.2 Participants
We collected 828 responses, but only 604 (73%) com-
pleted the survey, and 517 (62%) passed at least two at-
tention checks. The rest of the paper focuses on these 517
responses. Table 2 shows the demographics of our survey.
As we expected, respondents were young and educated:
more than 71% were younger than 36, and 61% had at
least a graduate or post-graduate degree. 44% percent
also considered themselves at least highly knowledgeable
in matters of Internet privacy and security.
5 https://reddit.com/r/tor/, https://reddit.com/r/onions/
https://reddit.com/r/samplesize/.
Age # % Gender # % Continent of residence # % Education # %
18–25 2 11.8 Female 5 29.4 Asia 3 17.6 No degree 1 5.9
26–35 10 58.8 Male 12 70.6 Australia 1 5.9 High school 3 17.7
36–45 4 23.5 Europe 4 23.5 Graduate 3 17.7
46–55 1 5.9 North America 8 47.1 Postgraduate 10 58.8
South America 1 5.9
Table 1: The distribution over gender, age, country of residence, and education for our 17 interview subjects. We do not show
per-person demographic information to protect the identity of our interview subjects.
Gender # % Age # % Education # % Domain knowledge # %
Male 438 84.7 18–25 186 35.9 No degree 25 4.8 None 1 0.2
Female 49 9.4 26–35 180 34.8 High school 172 33.2 Mild 35 6.8
Other 25 4.8 36–45 87 16.8 Graduate 214 41.4 Moderate 178 34.4
No Response 5 1.0 46–55 43 8.3 Post graduate 102 19.7 High 227 43.9
56–65 16 3.1 No Response 4 0.4 Expert 75 14.5
> 65 3 0.6 No Response 1 0.2
No Response 2 0.4
Table 2: The distribution over gender, age, education, and domain knowledge of the survey respondents. Providing demographic
information was optional, so we lack data for some respondents.
4.3 Domain Name Service (DNS) Queries
We analyzed .onion domains leaked via the Domain
Name System (DNS) to better understand onion service
usage and look for specific evidence of usability issues
(e.g., onion domains with typographical errors, phishing
attacks). Although onion domains are only resolvable
inside the Tor network, Internet users may attempt to ac-
cess an onion site using a browser that is not configured
to use Tor, resulting in the DNS query for onion domain
“leaking” to conventional DNS resolvers—and ultimately
to a DNS root server. Because all onion lookups to a
conventional DNS server will result in a cache miss, all
leaked onion lookups will ultimately go to a DNS root
server. Thus, DNS root servers see a good sample of
leaked onion domains. Our work builds on a previous
analysis of a similar data set that was conducted several
years ago and which was not focused on onion services
specifically like our work [18, 33].
We obtained about several days of DNS data from
the B root server through the IMPACT Cyber Trust pro-
gram [34]. This data has several hundred pcap files, which
contain full packet captures with pseudonymized IP ad-
dresses of all DNS traffic to the B root from September
19, 2017 10:00 UTC to September 21, 2017 23:59 UTC.
We analyzed the DNS queries dataset and present our re-
sults alongside our findings from the survey and interview
results. We extracted the QNAME of each DNS query,
which yielded 15,471 correctly formatted onion domains
that were 16 characters long (representing an 80-bit hash
of the owner’s public key) had has any letters of the al-
phabet and numbers between 2 and 7. These lookups, of
course, may not always correspond to a real onion site,
but they do reflect that some machine issued a DNS query
for that onion domain for some reason.
4.4 Limitations
As we previously mentioned, we asked The Tor Project
to disseminate our survey on its blog and Twitter account,
which likely yielded the following biases.
Non-response bias. People who noticed our call for vol-
unteers but decided against participating may have valued
their privacy too much, falsely believed that their perspec-
tive is irrelevant, lacked time, or had other reasons not to
participate. Nevertheless, non-respondents may exhibit
traits that are fundamentally different from those who did
participate.
Survivor bias. Our participants generally were able to
tolerate Tor Browser’s usability issues, which is why they
are still around to tell their tale. We likely did not hear
from people who decided that Tor Browser was not for
them and were thus unable to tell us what drove them
away. The danger of survivor bias lies in optimizing the
user experience for the subset of people whose tolerance
for inconvenience is higher than the rest.
Self-selection bias. Due to the nature of our online sur-
vey, participants could voluntarily select themselves into
our set of respondents. These respondents may be un-
usually engaged, technical, and opinionated. Indeed, the
demographic for our online survey in Section 4.2 was
young and educated; perhaps Tor Browser’s population
is young and educated, as well, but we have no way of
knowing.
5 Results
We organize the presentation of our findings by topic, in-
cluding how users perceive and use (Section 5.1), manage
(Section 5.2), and wish to improve (Section 5.3) onion
Figure 3: A sketch of interviewee P03’s mental model of onion
services. The participant referred to several layers of protection.
services. We interleave the results from our online sur-
vey with our interviews and domain name system data as
appropriate.
5.1 Perception and Use
We first explore how users perceive onion site technology
and why they use onion sites.
5.1.1 Incomplete mental models of onion services
We asked only our interviewees (not our survey partic-
ipants) about their mental models of onion services be-
cause it is difficult to collect this type of information
from a survey. This section thus presents results from the
interviews only.
Perceptions of what an onion service is. We asked our
interview participants how they defined an onion service,
how they work, and what types of content and services
they tend to host. Terminology was inconsistent and some-
times confusing: some interviewees referred to onion
services as the dark web and others as hidden services.
(Recall that The Tor Project only uses the term onion
services). About half of our interviewees (9/17) knew
that onion services enabled a user to access Web content
anonymously. Six interviewees stated that onion services
provide extra layers of protection, an idea that is well-
illustrated in Figure 3,6 and further elaborated on by par-
ticipant P03:“I think it’s to do with the different hops that
you build - different layers of making it difficult to find out
who this person is.” Four interviewees stated that onion
services work in a similar manner to Tor but with different
encryption methods, which we can see on Figure 4. A
minority of participants had sophisticated understanding:
they referred to the encryption of data on the end points
of a connection; three interviewees referred to the fact
that last hop along the encrypted path corresponds to an
onion link.
Perception of anonymity. Five interview participants
drew the connection between Tor and onion services, stat-
ing that onion services have to be accessed through Tor
6All sketches are available online at https://nymity.ch/
onion-services/mental-models/.
Figure 4: Comparison of two sketches from interviewee P13.
The first sketch shows the P13’s mental model of Tor and the
second one P13’s mental model of onion services.
browser but at least one did not see any connection be-
tween Tor and onion services. Only three interview par-
ticipants knew that onion services do not only provide
anonymity to the visitors to a website but also to the onion
website provider themselves. In contrast to these inter-
viewees who had some sense of what an onion service
was, nearly half of our interviewees (8/17) were confused
about how to define onion services, were unsure how
onion services function or how to describe them, and did
not understand how onion services protect them. Some of
our interviewees did not distinguish disguising their IP ad-
dress from disguising their real-world identity and instead
used the umbrella term “anonymity” to refer to both con-
cepts. This conflation of concepts paints an incomplete
picture of the security and privacy guarantees that the Tor
network provides, with only a few interviewees recogniz-
ing that anonymity is not completely achievable with Tor
onion services: “What’s the point of going to Facebook
using onion services when their business model is still
about collecting your data?” (P7). Other participants
simply thought of onion services as P08 characterized
them: “[the] Internet without hyperlinks.” Some of our
participants were not aware that onion services provide
end-to-end security and self-certifying names. Syverson
and Boyce explored how onion services can improve web-
site authentication [32], but these benefits are difficult to
convey to non-technical users, and even some experts ad-
vocated an “all or nothing” approach to online anonymity,
overlooking important nuances.
The presence of a large quantity onion domains in the
root DNS data corroborates prior studies that suggest
either Internet users are attempting to visit an onion do-
main in a non-Tor browser indicating a misunderstanding
of onion links, that browsers are loading content with
onion links using pre-fetching, or that some web pages
or malware are attempting to load resources from onion
sites [18, 33].
Perceptions of what an onion service is used for. Inter-
viewees had various perceptions of what onion services
were used for or why they existed in the first place. In-
0 25 50 75 100
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70.79
Figure 5: Reasons for using onion services.
terviewees sometimes associated onion services with il-
licit content such as the drug trade or credit card data
sales (2/17) or felt that onion services may be the technol-
ogy behind anonymous purchases. Similarly, as reported
later in the paper, many survey respondents also voiced
concern about illegal and questionable content on onion
services, described by some as a “Wild West”. Phishing
sites, honeypots, and compromised onion sites further
contribute to this perception.
5.1.2 Onion services used mostly for more anonymity
Usage. Our survey asked how often our respondents
browse onion services. The usage frequency was almost
uniformly distributed among our survey respondents; 24%
use onion sites less than once a month, 22% use them
about monthly, 25% weekly, and 23% daily. The remain-
ing 6% had never used an onion service. We also asked
our interviewees if they had used onion in the last three
months; seven had and seven had not, with four of the
latter group explaining that they had used onion services
before, just not in the last three months. Only two inter-
viewees had never used onion services before at all.
Anonymity and onion service content. The majority of
our survey participants who used onion services did so
because of the additional anonymity (71%) and the ad-
ditional security (62%) (see Figure 5). For instance, six
survey respondents commented on the onion domain for-
mat, indicating that they believed the seemingly-random
characters in onion domains are the reason why onion ser-
vices are anonymous: “Onion services stay anonymous
through changing their domain, and I feel that there is
a possibility of decreased anonymity with a constant do-
main name.” (S436). These participants also believed
that vanity domains are “less anonymous” because part
of their domains is clearly not random. One survey par-
ticipant (S454) further wrote:“I understand vanity onion
domains are a sign of the weakness of the hash algorithm
used by the Tor network.”
Anonymity was also the main reason why our inter-
viewees used onion services (6/17). Another reassuring
factor for two of our interviewees was the feeling of secu-
rity and safety that onion services provide. Furthermore,
two interview participants thought of onion services as
“harm reduction technique.” P10 preferred to use Face-
book’s onion domain because it impedes tracking efforts.
Additionally, 47% of survey respondents and three inter-
viewees viewed onion services as the only way to access
content they enjoy, making the use of onion services a
necessity.
Non-browsing activities. Of our survey respondents who
used onion services (485/517), 64% had these services for
purposes other than web browsing. Several protocols such
as the chat application Ricochet [4] and the file sharing
application OnionShare [15] were purpose-built on top
of onion services while existing TCP-based tools such
as ssh can transparently use onion addresses instead of
traditional IP addresses. Less than a quarter (21%) of our
survey participants used onion services for non-browsing
activities at least once a month such as remote login (ssh)
or chat (IRC or XMPP). Our interviewees similarly men-
tioned using onion services to access Pirate Bay (1/17),
Ricochet (1/17), TorChat (1/17), and OnionShare (1/17).
Work or personal reasons. Survey respondents who se-
lected “Other” (45%) for onion service usage provided
many reasons, including personal (18/517), with the most
predominant personal reason being that an onion service
gives a machine behind a network address translation
(NAT) device a stable identifier and can be reached from
any other user on the Tor network (there are other ways
to achieve this goal, but for these users, setting up an
onion service was the easiest way). Several interviewees
used onion services to accomplish specific tasks. Five
interviewees reported that they use onion services simply
for their work, while four stated personal reasons, such
as for a personal blog, or giving someone access to their
home network. Two interview participants used onion
services for educational purposes. P3 used onion services
to help teach students about the dark web: “I was teach-
ing a class on Internet technology and regulations. We
were basically showing students how Tor works and part
of what I have to do as a teaching assistant was make
students go and basically get to the moment where they
either hire a hitman, buy drugs, or buy weapons. Just to
show that it’s possible. And then obviously we didn’t buy
it.”
Other survey respondents reported using onion services
to reduce the load on exit relays, to do technical research,
and to access sites that are otherwise unavailable. For
instance, 7/517 used onion services for hosting a service,
one survey respondent admitted using onion services for
e-book piracy, two used onion services as an alternative
0 25 50 75 100
Percentage of Participants
No Response
Other
Automatic Creation
Anonymity
NAT Traversal
Curiosity
End-to-end Security
60.73
8.7
10.83
17.98
21.66
23.4
24.17
Figure 6: Reasons for running onion services.
to a virtual private network and two used them to make
their website as private and personal as they could.
Exploring the dark web. 27% of our survey respondents
and two interviewees wanted to find out more about the
dark web and onion domain content (3/517) as reasons to
use onion services. Two interviewees used onion services
for fun and social reasons—to “toy around” (P7) and
also, as a way of spending time with friends, as well as to
“show off” around them by using a technology unfamiliar
to most users. Interestingly, 19% of survey respondents
said that they use onion services for no particular reason
but have clicked on onion links occasionally.
5.1.3 Onion sites operated for various reasons
Setting up an onion service. 39% of survey respondents
had set up an onion service at some point. Of the re-
spondents who had set up onion services of their own
(266/517), 31% had run their onion service for private use
while 21% had run them for the public. Figure 6 gives
an overview of the reasons our respondents have for run-
ning onion services. For instance, the majority of those
with onion services used them for end-to-end security,
curiosity, or NAT traversal. Only 18% survey respondents
had set up onion services for anonymity, such as to pro-
tect their visitors and provide security on their sites. In
the open-ended responses, eleven survey respondents set
up onion services because then their websites could be
accessed from anywhere in the world, and seven survey
respondents set up an onion service simply to test and
learn how they work. Another two survey participants
ran onion mirror sites to their personal websites, and at
least one had an onion service as a backup website in
case he lost control over his personal domain. Finally, at
least two survey respondents set up onion for business
purposes, work requirements, or to add valuable content
to the onion community. In a similar vein, at least two
interviewees spoke about setting up onion services or
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using onion services for work, such as to help Internet
users upload leaked documents to their whistleblower
website anonymously. In another example, P5 used onion
services in the academic peer review process to allow
authors to submit source code or supplementary material
anonymously: “If one of the other reviewers connects
to our university site, and we have some sort of tracking
information on there, we would be deanonymizing the re-
viewer. We put it on a Tor hidden service to make sure that
the reviewer remains blind in academic review process.”
Phishing concerns. We inquired how concerned the sur-
vey respondents were about three potential attacks on
their own onion services: (i) somebody setting up a phish-
ing site for the operator’s site, (ii) a denial-of-service
attack, and (iii) a deanonymization attack. According
to the results, shown in Figure 7, less than 8% of our
survey respondents who operated an onion service were
at least somewhat concerned about all of these attacks.
Only a small percentage, 15%, claimed to be extremely
concerned about somebody deanonymizing their onion
service, 10% were extremely concerned about an onion
site being taken offline, and only 9% were concerned
about an onion site being impersonated for phishing pur-
poses. Indeed, in the open-ended responses, we noted that
several respondents lamented the difficulty of protecting
onion services from application-layer deanonymization
attacks. Matic et al. demonstrated some of these attacks
in 2015 [17].
5.1.4 Varying trust in Tor and onion services
Our survey asked how safe our respondents feel when
using Tor Browser and onion services, respectively. Fig-
ure 8 shows that onion services were actually perceived
as less safe than Tor browser. 85% of survey respondents
feel at least somewhat safe or very safe using Tor Browser
as compared to only 66% of onion service users.
Reasons for trust. Survey responses indicated that par-
100 0 100 200 300 400
Responses
Onion Services
Tor Browser
Very Unsafe
Somewhat Unsafe
Neutral
Somewhat Safe
Very Safe
Figure 8: Safety that respondents perceive when using Tor
Browser and onion services.
ticipants, most of whom (85%) rated themselves as non-
experts (versus 15% self-rated experts) in knowledge
about Internet privacy and security, lacked the ability
to evaluate (or even understand) the Tor network’s design
which is why they deferred to expert opinion, their gut
feeling, or the trust they place in Tor developers to gauge
how much to trust these services. As S450 put it:‘There’s
a safety tradeoff. My connection to onion sites is more
secure from outside eyes, but onion sites are more likely to
be scams.’ With respect to onion services, the majority of
survey respondents expressed that the added security and
anonymity made them feel safe (117/517). Another factor
contributing to the perceived security of onion services is
that advertising companies are nowhere near as present on
onion services as they are on the Web. 80/517 respondents
trusted Tor and themselves to be safe on onion services
while only a minority of interviewees were content and
believed in the future of onion services (4/17) or placed
their trust in them (2/17). Additionally, 30/517 partici-
pants said they would also choose onion services over
regular websites because they trust them.
Reasons for distrust. 90/517 of survey respondents were
skeptical of trusting onion services because of the possi-
bility of phishing, the fact that onion services are hard to
verify as authentic, and a concern that tracking can still
occur even with onion services (59/517). Furthermore, at
least 20/517 respondents said their trust of onion services
would depend on the content of the services themselves.
Some survey respondents did not have a clear understand-
ing of onion services or thought they were the same as
regular websites and reported as much (34/517).
Although our interviewees tended to see onion services
as safer than corresponding websites (eight versus four
participants), six participants felt that users should be
careful when using onion services. Not all participants
trusted onion services (5/17) and one expressed frustra-
tion such as P06:“I’m pretty distrusting with most of the
content I access over onion services. When I want content
from a service, I tend to distrust it from the beginning.”
Two interviewees mentioned that websites cannot identify
you as the general advantage of onion services but at least
three participants pointed out that websites actually can
determine your identity if you write down your personal
details as well as if you log in into any private accounts
while using onion services. Similarly, 20 survey respon-
dents also raised concerned and mentioned not wanting
to log in to onion sites because they believe it defeats the
purpose by revealing private data.
Moreover, one interview participant (P10) claimed that
using onion links may influence the usability of their “nor-
mal” corresponding websites—the person shared a story
in which they postulated that their Facebook account had
been flagged for suspicious activity and then was deac-
tivated because they had logged in through Tor Browser.
These interview participants did not realize that while the
company indeed knows who is logging in, it does not
know Tor users’ IP address or operating system.
5.2 Discovery and Management
We now explore how users discover and keep track of
onion sites.
5.2.1 Discovering onion links is not straightforward
Recall that a freshly set up onion service is private by
default, leaving it up to its operator to disseminate the
domain. Established search engines such as Google are
therefore generally inadequate to find content on onion
services. Therefore discovering onion services is not as
straightforward as with regular domains Figure 9 illus-
trates the results from our survey.
Social networking site and search engines. The three
most popular ways that almost half of our survey partic-
ipants discovered onion sites by were via (i) social net-
working sites such as Twitter and Reddit (48%), (ii) search
engines such as Ahmia,7 (46%) and (iii) randomly en-
countering links when browsing the Web (46%). Sur-
vey respondents who selected “Other” (16%) for how
they discover onion links predominantly brought up
independently-maintained onion domain aggregators. A
noteworthy example is the Hidden Wiki used by 13 sur-
vey respondents, a community-curated and frequently-
forked wiki that contains categorized links to onion ser-
vices. At least 34 survey respondents searched for onion
links on regular browsers and 18 of these respondents
looked specifically at regular websites to see if they had
7Ahmia.fi is an onion site search engine that crawls user-submitted
onion domains. It publishes the list of all indexed onion services at
https://ahmia.fi/onions/.
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Figure 9: Methods of discovering onion services.
a corresponding onion link. In our interviews, two par-
ticipants mentioned these techniques too. Between one
to three survey respondents mentioned each of the fol-
lowing: using onion link lists generated by onion spiders,
onion.torproject.org, ddg.onion, Imageboard, Google, and
even Wikipedia.
We observed similar patterns in our interview respon-
dents. Interviewees told us that they find onion links by
word of mouth (6/17), using a search engine tool (5/17)
including tools like DuckDuckGo (1/17), The Pirate
Bay (1/17), Reddit (1/17), ahmia.fi (1/17), and the search
widget in the Tor browser (1/17). More of our intervie-
wees discovered onion services passively (6/17) by just
happening to hear about or know about specific onion
services while five interviewees told us that they looked
actively for onion links, browsing for the content they
needed.
Random encounters or word of mouth. A significantly
less popular discovery mechanism was discovering links
through word of mouth, which has the advantage that
domains come from a trusted source (18% of survey re-
spondents). 19/517 were frustrated that it was difficult to
find out if a regular website had an onion service version
even if they visited their website. Only 4% of our sur-
vey respondents—indicated that they were not interested
in learning about new onion services because they only
use their own sites (7/517). Similarly, two interviewees
claimed that they never searched for new onion links.
Link discovery challenges. The majority of our survey
respondents (55%) reported that they were satisfied with
how they discover onion services but a significant pro-
portion of our participants (38%) were not and 7% did
not respond to this question. Those satisfied reported
that they had no interest in learning about new onion ser-
vices, in part because they only use a small set of onion
services. Among the survey respondents who were not
satisfied with how they discover onion services (38%),
many (28/517) complained in the open-ended responses
about link rot on aggregators where onion links were bro-
ken, unusable, or outdated. There is significant churn
among onion sites, and our respondents were frustrated
that aggregators are typically not curated and therefore
link to numerous dead domains. The lack of curation
also leads to these aggregators’ containing the occasional
scam and phishing site. The difficulty of telling apart two
given onion domain names exacerbates this issue for users.
15/517 did not trust onion link lists because it is hard to
validate if they are legitimate or not. 28/517 complained
about filtering onion sites related to their interests with
several wanting to avoid illegal and pornographic content,
which is often difficult if the description is vague and the
onion domain reveals nothing about its content. For this
reason, 5/517 wished aggregators were more verbose in
their description of onion sites.
Lack of good search engines. Many survey respon-
dents complained about the lack of good search engines
(33/517) and were not aware of search engines such as
Ahmia. Among survey respondents who were aware of
such engines, many were dissatisfied with both the search
results and the number of indexed onion sites. Unsurpris-
ingly, a “Google for onion sites” was a frequent wish.
Similarly, one of the biggest issues for our interview par-
ticipants was that onion sites are hard to find (5/17), or
as P13 put it: “How do you find stuff if you don’t know
what you’re looking for or only have a vague idea?” 10
survey respondents desired a better searching solution for
onion services even with recognizing that this would be
a tradeoff for security so services should have opt-in and
opt-out options for discovery. As summarized by one sur-
vey respondent: “Tor is still like the early 1990s Internet
where websites were spread by word of mouth and by
lists of links. In Tor, people publish lists of onion sites
and I pick the ones I’m interested in. Every Tor search
engine is poor and unreliable. Lists of links like Fresh
Onions, while useful, often get out of date quickly, since
many onion sites are unreliably hosted. Tor desperately
needs a good search engine to find onion sites and ide-
ally some way of identifying what those sites are about
before clicking on them, since we lack that info in the
URL.” (S339)
5.2.2 Saving and tracking onion links is difficult
Bookmarking links. Conventional domains are often
easy to remember and recognize; most onion domains
are random strings. We explored how users coped with
this challenge. Most survey respondents (52%) use Tor
Browser’s bookmarks or a web-based bookmarking tool
(3%) to save onion domains as seen in Figure 10. At least
two interview participants reported bookmarking links as
well. While convenient, this method of saving onion links
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Figure 10: Strategies to manage onion domains.
leaves a trace of (presumably) visited sites on somebody’s
computer. One of Tor Browser’s security requirements is
“disk avoidance”—the browser must not write anything
to disk that would reveal the user’s browsing history [24,
§ 2.1]. Bookmarking links is a violation of this security
requirement, albeit one that users seem to want.
Ad-hoc tracking methods. Somewhat less popular
amongst our survey participants was saving onion do-
mains in local text files (37%), getting them from trusted
websites (35%), using search engines (18%), memorizing
domains (17%), using some other techniques (9%), or
employing pen and paper (8%). Of the 9% of our survey
respondents who selected “Other”, 15/517 stated that they
store onion domains in an encrypted manner—either in a
text file or in their password manager. Other techniques
mentioned by only one or two survey respondents each
included using auto-complete, storing them on a personal
blog or using Twitter to find links, emailing the links to
oneself, using redirect rules to automatically go to the
.onion domain, storing the links in a virtual machine, or
using Hidden Wiki. Four of our interviewees reported
that they store onion services in a list and three remember
(some) onion services. Other techniques for saving onion
links mentioned by interviewees mirrored those of the
survey and included using a Twitter feed to track onion
links (1/17) and using TorChat as storage places for onion
links (1/17). Moreover, one interviewee believed that Tor
Browser remembers onion links and another interview
participant (P1) explained: “The onion services we run
professionally we keep track of because we operate the
server, so that’s easy.” Notably, just over one-quarter of
our survey respondents (26%) did not have a good solu-
tion to the problem of tracking onion links and similarly
two interviewees pointed out that they lacked an onion
link management mechanism.
Reaching onion domains quickly. We also asked our in-
terviewees how they typically reach onion services. The
most often mentioned technique was copy and pasting
domains, done by four interviewees, followed by three in-
terviewees who simply click on links they encounter. Two
interviewees would go to onion sites using bookmarks
while another two use Google to get to onion services.
Only one interview participant told us that they typed
the domains from their notes. Given the high number of
(possibly insecure) home-baked solutions, a Tor Browser
extension that solves the problem of saving and tracking
onion links seems warranted.
5.2.3 Onion domains are hard to remember
Memorization reasons. Our participants often memo-
rized onion domains to make it easier to visit onion sites
and to minimize traces of their browsing habits. Of the
survey respondents who memorize onion domains, we
found that most respondents do no memorize any onion
domains (60%) and less than a third (30%) memorize one
to four onion domains. Only 3% can memorize more
than four domains. Survey respondents who memorized
domains (65% of all respondents) did so (i) automatically
because of typing a domain many times (20%) (ii) to al-
low them to open an onion site more quickly (17%), and
(iii) to ensure that they are visiting the correct site and not
a phishing site (15%). Only 9% were privacy conscious
and did so because bookmarking onion domains leaves
a trace. 5% of the respondents gave other reasons for
memorizing onion links. In these open-ended responses,
18 survey participants said that memorizing was simply
easy for them, even unintentional. Among these partici-
pants, there were only 8/517 that specifically mentioned
the Facebook onion site as very easy to remember. Only
a few survey respondents (3/517) did not memorize onion
sites at all.
Memorization challenges. Our interview participants
generally found onion domains problematic in terms of
having to remember random strings of letters and numbers.
Four interviewees perceived onion domains as too long.
Among these participant was one who further complained
about random characters in onion domains. At least two
interviewees criticized onion links for being hard to re-
member. This viewpoint was echoed in our survey, where
participants rated URLs such as expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion
and torproz4wqqyqhjn.onion as harder to remember be-
cause the “numbers make the names harder to remember.”
Other survey respondents stated that vanity domains are
easier to remember when they can be pronounced as de-
scribed in the example quote by survey respondent (S46):
“phonetic pronunciation plays a large part in how I re-
member onions.” Many other survey respondents stated
that onion domains that are supported by a mnemonic are
also easier to remember; we elaborate on this result in
Section 5.2.4.
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5.2.4 Vanity domains: more memorable, less trusted
Memorizability. The majority of our survey respondents
appreciated vanity domains because they were easy to
remember (64%) and easy to recognize (64%), and they
provided a unique “branding” (34%). Some survey re-
spondents indicated that a vanity prefix—like a traditional
domain—informs about an onion service’s content, let-
ting visitors know what to expect and thus preventing
unpleasant surprises but at least 3/517 wanted more clues
to let visitors know more about what the domain content
is or for some content to be harder to find. As S423 wrote:
“For less important, high traffic sites (social media like
Facebook), it’s okay. For sites handling much more sensi-
tive/potentially illicit content, its a good idea to make it
difficult to find.”
Only 15% did not have an opinion about vanity do-
mains, 8% reported that they disliked vanity onion do-
mains, and 7% did not see a benefit of vanity do-
mains. We asked survey respondents about whether
or not they memorize vanity domains—specifically
facebookcorewwwi.onion—and how difficult they find it
to memorize onion domains of differing levels of van-
ity. Only 20% of respondents replied that facebook-
corewwwi.onion is among the sites that they have mem-
orized. This is because it is “easy to memorize” (S391)
and “after seeing [it] many times, I automatically start to
memorize it.”(S94) Depending on the format of the vanity
domain, our survey respondents expressed differing levels
of ease for memorizing them; these results are shown in
Figure 11. Most participants found it easier to memorize
vanity domains with a longer recognizable prefix such as
Facebook’s. Interestingly, only 4/517 survey respondents
considered vanity domains economically unfair because
wealthy entities can afford to generate longer prefixes
such as Facebook.
Usable links. Ten out of seventeen interviewees saw van-
ity domains as a significant usability improvement to the
regular onion domains: “In terms of mnemonics and eas-
ier recollection if you can chunk words that are associated
with daily life and not just a random. If there’s entropy
in the stream, there’s no way I’m going to remember
more than a few characters” (P18). P10 had a different
perspective that suggested these vanity domains make
onion services more usable: “I think that for people who
don’t spend a lot of time using those types of services, it
definitely gives you a more familiar framework for think-
ing about where you are on the Internet. If people think
. . . people have a pretty strange geographic metaphors for
navigating the Internet, but I think this idea of where are
you? Well, I’m at this place I can’t even name, I can’t say
it out loud, I think that can be a barrier for people.”
Phishing and security. If users focus on the vanity part
of a domain only, attackers can create an similar domain
that features the original’s prefix but differs in subsequent
characters. Nurmi [23] and Monteiro [19] have both
documented such an attack, but its effectiveness is not
known.
Indeed, in several cases, both survey (29/517) and in-
terview participants found that vanity domains were not
practical and seemed to distrust them because they felt
they made phishing easier: “I don’t think it’s useful be-
cause . . . it’s followed by another random word . . . and
phishing can still copy that . . . I don’t think what I can re-
member is safe now.” (P17). Similarly, as S94 explained:
“We also get false expectations of security from such do-
mains. Somebody can generate another onion key with
same facebookcorewwwi address. It’s hard but may be
possible. People who believe in uniqueness of generated
characters, will be caught and impersonated.”. Among
our survey respondents, there was also concern that the
short and recognizable prefixes tempt users to verify only
the prefix and ignore the non-vanity part of the onion
domain, as epitomized by one survey respondent: “I only
memorize the first part of the domain.” (S96) while an-
other wrote: “If there isn’t some cognizable word at the
start, it’ll be more difficult for me to determine if I’m go-
ing to the correct domain or a scam. I may end up going
to less onion sites as a result.” (S355)
This viewpoint was echoed by our interview partici-
pants, who noticed that vanity domains can negatively
affect security. P13 explained: “I think in theory, on the
one [hand], it makes it easier for you to recognize where
you are, it makes it easier for you to perhaps, share the
URL or type it out. On the other hand, I’ve seen con-
cerns that, by having a vanity URL where perhaps people
only look for the Facebook portion and they don’t pay
attention to what comes after it could potentially make it
easier to exploit unsuspecting users. Send them a link that
also says Facebook but the numbers after it are different,
but you just see the Facebook part and go, ‘It’s fine, it’s
Facebook.’ That can be a risk to them.” P5 also shared
their view on vanity domains: “It seems like it would
encourage more trust on behalf of the user, but then again,
maybe make phishing easier too, if phishers are making
vanity domains themselves. Yeah, that seems like it could
go both ways actually.”
5.2.5 Onion sites are hard to verify as authentic
Verification techniques. We asked our participants about
verifying the authenticity of an onion site. The majority
of our survey respondents (79%) did want to verify an
onion service as authentic. Figure 12 gives an overview
of the strategies that our respondents employ. Most of the
respondents (64%) copied and pasted onion links from
trusted sources (e.g., friends or another, trusted website)
or used bookmarks when revisiting onion services (52%).
Many survey respondents also verified the domain in
the browser’s address bar (45%), checked if the corre-
sponding website had a link to its onion site (40%), or
checked that the onion service has a valid HTTPS cer-
tificate (36%).8 Survey respondents reporting checking
the corresponding regular website for verification, ver-
ifying if familiar images were recognized, or checking
for HTTPS (9/517). 8/517 only used links if received
form a trusted resource or trusted member of a commu-
nity or check with their notes (4/517). 5/517 trusted their
perception of a website as verification of authenticity or
Tor or the fact that onion sites are self-certified by design
(3/517) or use the fact that they could log into a site as
verification (5/517). Only a few mentioned using multiple
sources to verify authenticity (3/517) and at least 9 survey
respondents said that they did not use onion links at all.
When asked how many characters our survey respon-
dents verify in onion domains, 19% verified thirteen to six-
teen digits, i.e., (almost) the full domain, while 20% veri-
fied up to nine digits, which is within the realm of brute
force attacks, and 5% verified between nine to twelve dig-
its. More than half of respondents provided no response
at all (54%).
For those interviewees (7/17) who did attempt to ensure
they were visiting an authentic onion site, we observed
two strategies: relying on someone else to ensure a link
was authentic and trying to work out authenticity using
various techniques on their own. Most interviewees in
the first group stated that they rely on word of mouth
for verification (5/17), followed by assistance from some-
one else (4/17). P3 explained “[I] let people show me
them. I don’t go there myself.” Two interview partici-
pants relied on resources they already trusted for onion
links, like friends and other communities and two ac-
cessed onion services by first visiting their corresponding
8DigiCert is issuing EV certificates for onion sites [7], but adoption
has been slow—presumably in part because EV certificates require the
CA to verify the applicant’s identity and they are not free.
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publicly available websites if they could to verify au-
thenticity. One of the most common approaches in the
second group (3/17) was to check and compare URLs to
see whether they matched to a “clearnet site” (P14), its
unencrypted version on the regular Internet. Furthermore,
two interview participants rely on their own experience,
one on HTTPS certificates, and another one would lower
the security settings in Tor Browser using the security
slider to check the website more thoroughly:“Sometimes,
it worries me, but before that I access, in Tor, I turn off,
I always. First, I always turn off the Java service and
etcetera, to check the website. I think it’s good, then I will
lower the security level in Tor browser, but mostly, I will
ask anything, maybe, in the Reddit or in the forum—in
my country forum—of what the service [may be].” (P17).
One interviewee believed that just using Tor is verifica-
tion in itself and another participant avoided onion sites
altogether.
Verification challenges. Indicative of potential security
issues, 29% of survey respondents stated that they some-
times could not tell the difference between an authentic
service and an impersonation, and 10% never checked a
service’s legitimacy in the first place. Survey participants
who selected “Other” (13%) provided a wide variety of
ad-hoc verification strategies, further highlighting the im-
portance of being able to verify a site as being the one
that they were trying to reach. For instance, 13 survey
respondents said there is no good way of verifying onion
services or they do not know how to.
We also asked our interview participants how they knew
that the site they went to was the one that they wanted to
visit. Similar to the survey respondents, six interviewees
reported that they did not know how to verify the authen-
ticity on an onion site and they were concerned about
being on an impersonating website because it is easy to
mistype onion domains and onion domains change fre-
quently if an onion service is short-lived or moves. P1
summarized the issue as being inherent to the nature of
onion services “I wouldn’t know how to do that, no. Isn’t
that the whole point of onion services? That people can
run anonymous things without being to find out who owns
and operates them?” Two interviewees even believed
onion site authentication to be impossible. For this rea-
son, some interviewees also proposed that onion domain
formats without numbers or with a stable patterns of let-
ters and numbers could potentially make sites easier to
reach and verify for authenticity.
5.2.6 Onion lookups suggest typos or phishing
Phishing remains an issue despite onion services’ extra
anonymity and security properties. Past work has docu-
mented phishing onion sites that transparently rewrote Bit-
coin addresses to hijack Bitcoin transactions [19, 23, 38].
Key to this attack is the difficulty of telling apart an au-
thentic onion domain from an impersonation. For con-
ventional domains we rely on EV certificates, browser
protections, search results, and long-lived reputation, but
none of these methods have matured for onion services.
Does the nature of onion services facilitate phishing at-
tacks? If so, what can we do to mitigate the issue?
Most interview participants (9/17) agreed that phish-
ing constitutes a serious risk, one of them explained the
phenomenon this way: “the two approaches I know from
the normal Web still apply here, which is typo-squatting,
registering an onion [domain] that’s only a slight vari-
ation away, or bit-squatting, which is slightly different,
but it involves a single or a few bit flips within an onion
address, so that it looks relatively similar” (P6), while an-
other interview participant presented their solution to this
problem: “If you’re manually typing it in I suppose they
could be a problem, but I primarily cut and paste” (P16).
We evaluated how often lookups to two different onion
domains are extremely similar to one another, which can
shed light on how often an onion domain may be phished,
since it is unlikely for distinct onion services to have
extremely similar strings for onion domains.
To do so, we computed the Jaro-Winkler similarity
metric between each unique pair of correctly formatted
onion domains, which is the edit distance between two
strings that gives more weight to strings with common
prefixes. We used this metric because people tend to
check the first part of the domain. Values range between
[0,1], where 0 represents completely different strings
and 1 represents matching strings, to each unique do-
main pair. We find that 0.007% (8,672) of all unique
domain pairs (119,668,185) have an extremely high sim-
ilarity (> .90); for example, bitfog2jzic5tnh7.onion
and bitfog2y7y2pfv75.onion have a Jaro-Winkler simi-
larity of 0.917.
We first analyzed the results of the similarity met-
ric for any well-known vanity domains. We found
Onion 1 # Onion 2 # J-W
57g7spgrzlojinas 1,621 57g7spgrziojinas 14 0.989
xxlvbrloxvriy2c5 1,593 xxlvbrioxvriy2c5 4 0.949
gx7ekbenv2riucmf 1,476 gm7ekbenv2riucmf 4 0.973
mischapuk6hyrn72 1,062 mischa5xyir2mrhd 8 0.902
petya3jxfp2f7g3i 1,061 petya3jxfb2f7g3i 8 0.997
petya3jxfp2f7g3i 1,061 petya37h5tbhyvki 58 0.907
mischa5xyix2mrhd 786 mischa5xyir2mrhd 8 0.999
hydraruzxpnew4af 529 hydraruzxpnew1af 2 0.999
hydraruzxpnew4af 529 hydraruehfq5poj5 2 0.927
hydraruzxpnew4af 529 hydraruzxpnew3af 2 0.999
3g2upl4pq6kufc4m 472 tg2upl4pq6kufc4m 2 0.971
3g2upl4pq6kufc4m 472 3g2upl4t5houfo4y 2 0.924
3g2upl4pq6kufc4m 472 3g2upl4oq6kuc4mm 2 0.954
3g2upl4pq6kufc4m 472 3g2upl4pe3kcf24d 2 0.973
zqktlwi4fecvo6ri 410 zqktlwipcfe3siu2 2 0.931
zqktlwi4fecvo6ri 410 zqktlwi4i34kbat3 12 0.946
Table 3: The Jaro-Winkler similarity score for frequently visited
onion domains in the DNS root dataset.
that Facebook’s onion site (facebookcorewwwi.onion)
has a similarity score of 0.953 with another onion
domain that was looked up facebookizqekmhz.onion,
which only appeared in our dataset twice (in compari-
son to the 101 instances of facebookcorewwwi.onion).
Another frequently looked up onion domain is
blockchainbdgpzk.onion, which is a popular Bitcoin
wallet; it was extremely similar to blockchatvqztbll.onion
(similarity score 0.949). These cases of similar domains
could be a potential indicator of phishing sites for popular
domains.
We next explored the top 20 most frequently requested
onion domains dataset by checking: whether they are ex-
tremely similar to another onion domain in our dataset,
and whether there is a large difference in frequency of the
two similar domains. Of the top 20 onion domains, 16
had a Jaro-Winkler similarity score > 0.90 with at least
one other onion domain in the data. Table 3 shows the
characteristics of these domains. Many of the domains
in the table under “Onion 1” are associated with either
the WannaCry Ransomware, the Mischa Ransomware,
or the Petya Ransomware. The remaining domains in
that column are real onion domains that returned search
results when used as input to https://ahmia.fi; these
include a Russian Market (hydraruzxpnew4af.onion),
DuckDuckGo (3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion), and The Hid-
den Wiki (zqktlwi4fecvo6ri.onion).
5.3 Areas for Improvement
When we asked about areas for improvement in the survey
and interviews, participants told us that onion services
could be enhanced technically and performance-wise, and
that privacy and security, educational resources on, and
methods for discovering onion content could be improved.
Technical Improvements. In our open ended question on
improvements to onion services, 43/517 did not provide
an answer and 36/517 expressed their gratitude for Tor
and Torproject and were satisfied with the service overall.
However, many respondents spoke of possible enhance-
ments. The majority of survey respondents (59/517) men-
tioned technical improvements they would like to see for
onion services such as improving support for Javascript,
making onion services available in other browsers, and
having more support for mobile devices. 17/517 wanted
a better user interface and user experience with onion ser-
vices in general. Our interviewees also mentioned various
technical improvements they would like to see in onion
services. Two wanted a secure bookmarking tool and an-
other interviewee wanted CAPTCHAs to be gone (these
are triggered more often with onion services). Only four
talked about wanting to see influential websites or even
all websites set up corresponding onion sites.
Performance Concerns. At least 48 survey respondents
had performance concerns about onion services. For ex-
ample, one survey user stated, “I would always prefer
the onion site but for video sites like YouTube I would
likely often use the normal site to be able to get a higher
quality stream due to higher bandwidth.” (S435) Three
interview participants similarly raised the “slowness” of
onion services.
Privacy and Security. 34 survey participants expressed
concern about anonymity and security issues and would
like to feel and be safer over the Tor network more gen-
erally. For instance, S70 wrote: ‘I hear a lot of social
media questions from casual or unsophisticated users,
and the single biggest problem is that they don’t have the
slightest idea of exactly what’s being protected and what
isn’t. Vague pronouncements that "doing X is safer" don’t
help. Tor needs to stop being muddy in explaining what
it protects, and stop promoting itself to people who don’t
understand what it can and can’t do for them.’ 11/517
complained about lack of anonymity protection specifi-
cally from government, big companies or even Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 8/517 wanted to verify
onion services as legitimate or live and only 2/517 spoke
about not wanting the dark net to contain criminal content.
Education and Resources. 24 survey respondents be-
lieved that there was a “‘knowledge” issue with not
enough resources and documentation for newcomers to
Tor and onion services. Many of our interviewees felt
similarly (7/17). Interviewees lamented about a lack of
documentation or resources that would allow newcom-
ers to learn more about onion services. P8, for example,
wanted to know how to use onion services correctly and
stop being uncertain about its properties: “Really clear
user education in the installation process would be great
for people like me . . . who are like ‘Okay, this is a thing I
can use, why am I using it again? What am I using it for?
What does it do?” Three of our interviewees also referred
to the lack of proper education as “cultural mysticism.”
Uneducated users often misunderstand concepts, as P10
explained: “The perception that these are hardcore se-
curity tools sometimes signals to ordinary users that they
are also difficult or badly designed or complicated to use,
and that’s not really the case with Tor.” Even if knowl-
edge was not an issue, fear of consequences may deter
users otherwise, as P8 mentioned before: “Because it’s
also super scary. You think you’re playing with this spy
thing . . . Sometimes it’s actually a really simple technical
thing that’s not terrifying. And to demystify those things
would be really nice.”
Improved Search. 15/517 survey respondents wanted
onion services to be more accessible, such as via a good
search engine or organized database. At least four in-
terviewees also desired improved search engines. As an
example of this sentiment, S116 wrote: ‘Ask someone
to develop a really good search engine so that sites may
be found. I am sure that the dark net has to be more
than a few illicit sites that are selling stolen credit cards,
and running Bitcoin scams. I feel like when I browse
the dark net, I am floating in space waiting for another
planet to suddenly appear. Whatever content is out there
needs to be discovered, lest people will make misinformed
judgments about the dark net. The dark net should be
understood to be preeminently about privacy, not crimi-
nality.’ In addition, many survey respondents expressed
frustration about the difficulty of finding out if a particu-
lar public website has a corresponding onion service. A
common wish was to have a website list its onion service
prominently in a footer or on the corresponding Internet
site (3/517). Ironically, some survey respondents were
surprised that torproject.org has a corresponding onion
site—they could not find it on the website.
6 Future Directions
Our work highlights several opportunities for improve-
ments to current onion services.
Security indicators for onion services. First, many of
our participants had an incomplete mental model of how
onion services work and trusted them less than other Tor
services, which suggests that a better indicator of the
protections an onion service offers should be made vis-
ible to onion service users. Currently, The Tor Project
is working on a security indicator for onion services [1].
Figure 2b illustrates that Tor Browser currently, in ver-
sion 7.0.10, displays an onion service connection as an
insecure HTTP connection, thus greatly “under-selling”
the security and privacy that an onion service connection
provides. The design process for such indicators should
evaluate whether users understand the meaning of the in-
dicator, as well as how it differs from an HTTPS indicator.
Figure 13: A click on the onion icon reveals the Tor relays that
constitute the circuit that was used to fetch the current page. As
of February 2018, the user interface is subject to a redesign [2].
(Felt et al. found the subtleties that one must consider
when designing similar security indicators [8].)
The Tor Browser’s circuit display interface is also being
redesigned (see Figure 13) [2]. As with an onion service
indicator, an evaluation of the circuit display could reveal
user misunderstandings that may improve perceptions of
and trust in onion services. For example, we found that
some users are not familiar with the concept of guard
relays and incorrectly expect each relay in their circuit to
change, which suggests the need for an improved inter-
face. Users also found it difficult to verify the authenticity
of an onion site; while certificates do help, many sites still
do not have them, and some may never have them.
Automatic detection of phishing onion domains. Our
findings that some onion domains in the root DNS data
have small edit distance to popular onion domains sug-
gests that users may fall victim typos to phishing attacks;
on the other hand, because the number of popular onion
domains is still relatively small and (through our analysis
and previous work [18, 33]) relatively well-known, the
Tor Browser could raise an alert when the user attempts
to access an onion domain that has a small edit distance
to a popular onion domain.
Opt-in publishing of onion sites. Our participants often
wanted more services to be available as onion services
and did not often know if an onion service for a popular
website existed. Participants found it difficult to discover
new onion services, which suggests the need for better
ways to find active onion services. While search engines
and curated lists do exist, they do not generally allow
users to locate an onion service of interest without also
stumbling upon unwanted content. One possibility is an
opt-in public log, whereby users can learn about new
onion domains as they are added. Many participants
also expressed interest in a browser feature that could
automatically “upgrade” from a regular web site to its
corresponding onion service. (The Tor Project is currently
investigating this problem space [13].)
Privacy-preserving onion bookmarking. Participants
found it difficult to track and save onion links; they often
resorted to memorizing links to avoid security issues with
storing onion links. This problem suggests the need for
a privacy-preserving bookmarking tool that allows users
to bookmark sites without leaving a trail in their browser
storage or elsewhere on their system.
7 Conclusion
Onion services resemble the 1990s web: Pages load
slowly, user interfaces are clumsy, and search engines
are inadequate. Users appreciate the extra security, pri-
vacy, and NAT punching properties of onion services,
which gives rise to a variety of use cases. Yet, users are
confronted with a variety of privacy, security and usability
concerns that should be addressed in future generations of
onion services. For example, users are concerned about
the susceptibility of onion domains to phishing attacks,
and the onion domains that are leaked to the public In-
ternet illustrate that this threat is real—and unaddressed.
Users have limited ways of discovering the existence of
onion services, let alone navigating to them.
A range of design improvements, from better discovery
mechanisms to automatic “upgrading” to a correspond-
ing onion service when it is available are initial steps to
improve usability. Some of these desired features have
clear analogs in the public Internet, such as the padlock
icon as a security indicator for HTTPS, and HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS) to automatically upgrade an
HTTP connection to HTTPS. We expect that many of the
usability design lessons from the public Internet may in
some cases also apply to onion services.
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